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H
yundai cars were once known for being faulty
and unreliable. They were the butt of American 
late-night talk-show jokes, with one suggesting
that a good way to frighten astronauts was by placing the
Hyundai logo on the spacecraft’s control panel. But
Hyundai has since regrouped, investing heavily in making
much sturdier cars. And judging by the rave reviews, its
efforts have been largely successful. 
The Korean carmaker, however, had to fight hard to
dispel its shoddy image. One way was to provide car 
buyers with a very generous 10-year or up to 100,000
miles warranty on its cars’ engine and transmission, the
first in the industry to do so. A warranty as bold as this
effectively backs Hyundai’s claims of a better car.
Consumers understand that a war-
ranty would be too costly to
provide if the company knows
that its product will frequent-
ly fall apart. Buyers typically
cannot discern the quality of
a car before purchasing it, so a 
warranty conveys a “signal” to
the buyer that this car is truly
as reliable as the company
says it is. 
Signaling is used in a large
number of settings, where infor-
mation about the strengths of a product or seller may be
difficult to observe directly but rather communicated
indirectly by using a signal. A company willing to 
pursue an expensive advertising campaign likewise 
tells consumers that it believes it has a quality product to 
offer buyers; otherwise it wouldn’t spend the money 
getting that information out to the public. Prior to wide-
spread labeling regulation, food makers who wanted to
signal that their products were healthy often voluntarily
placed the ingredients and nutritional values of their
goods on packages. Even if many consumers were ill-
equipped to make judgments about all of the information
provided, the fact it was there demonstrated that the pro-
ducers had nothing to hide to the health-conscious — in
fact, quite the opposite. Signals are also used in corporate
finance such as when a firm takes on debt to signal its
confidence about future profits. 
Without signals, buyers and sellers might have a frus-
trating time finding each other. Take the market for used
cars: If a buyer can’t tell the difference between good and
bad quality, then the best he is willing to pay is somewhere
in between. The problem is that the price is bound to be
lower than what the seller of the good car is asking, but
would undoubtedly make the seller of the bad car very
happy, because the price is much higher than what his car
is really worth. A possible result is that all good cars will
be taken off the market, and the used car lot will be left
with only the “lemons.” (In economics, this is known as
the problem of adverse selection.)
Signals are also pervasive in the job market, 
the example used by Stanford University economist
Michael Spence, who won the Nobel Prize for his influen-
tial work on signaling. Spence supposes that there are two
types of workers, one with a higher productivity than the
other. Both are looking for a job, and a prospective
employer or a firm would like to pay each
type according to what he is worth.
The problem is that the firm has
no way of separating the highly
productive types from the rest of
the pack, and so like in the mar-
ket for used cars, the firm will
simply offer the average wage. 
But the more productive 
fellow can do something to 
distinguish himself, for instance,
by going to school. Acquiring 
education signals to a prospective
employer that he is the more able
worker and deserves a higher wage. But what would stop
a less talented job candidate from also acquiring educa-
tion, in the hopes of signaling that he is as good as the
others? Spence notes that the cost of schooling must be
much higher for the less productive worker for the signal
to be believable. This might be true, for instance, if he
takes a much longer time to finish an academic degree.
He would then find it unprofitable to go to school just to
convince the employer that he is more capable than he
really is. 
Taken to the extreme, the theory of signaling suggests
that people acquire schooling because it is valuable as a
signal, but it does not make them more productive. 
The truth is probably somewhere in the middle, that 
education is partly about acquiring skills and partly about
trying to communicate one’s ability to a job recruiter. But
even some signaling, while beneficial for the individual
and the firm, can be a waste of resources from a broader
societal viewpoint. Indeed, if people had perfect informa-
tion, then a car dealer who aims to convince that he is not
some fly-by-night operator would not have to spend so
much money on building that swanky showroom. RF
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